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LAWRENCE V. TEXAS AND ROPER V.
SIMMONS: ENRICHING CONSTITUTIONAL
INTERPRETATION WITH INTERNATIONAL
LAW
HOLLY ARNOULD*
It does not lessen our fidelity to the Constitution or our pride in
its origins to acknowledge that the express affirmation of certain
fundamental rights by other nations and peoples simply under-
scores the centrality of those same rights within our own heritage
of freedom.1
INTRODUCTION
There is a jurisprudential battle looming over the Supreme
Court between the Justices who support the use of international
law in Constitutional interpretation and the other side headed
unofficially by Justice Scalia, who considers the practice com-
* J.D. Candidate 2007, St. John's University School of Law; B.A. Political Science, cum
laude, James Madison University, May 2004.
1 Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 578 (2005).
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pletely inappropriate. 2 Those who favor international law as an
interpretive tool emphasize the "increasing number of domestic
legal questions that directly implicate foreign or international
law."' 3 They also stress that the growing number of constitutional
issues addressed by foreign courts can serve as helpful compari-
sons.4 Those who oppose it claim that "however enlightened" the
Justices of other nations are, their views "cannot be imposed
upon Americans through the Constitution."5 This note discusses
two fairly recent Supreme Court cases Lawrence v. Texas6 and
Roper v. Simmons 7 and the Court's increased willingness to use
international law as persuasive authority in determining 'con-
temporary standards of decency' with regards to the crucial con-
stitutional areas of cruel and unusual punishment and due proc-
ess.8 It will argue that the Court's use of international law in
those instances were not only appropriate but vital. The cases
involved fundamental rights and evolving standards of decency,
which implicate the entire world community.
Part I will provide a background on the two principal methods
of constitutional interpretation. It will discuss how international
law was used to interpret the Constitution from the very found-
2 See Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 869 n.4 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (find-
ing that the majority's reliance on Amnesty International's account of what constitutes
civilized standards of decency in other countries is "inappropriate as a means of establish-
ing the fundamental beliefs of this Nation"); see also Sarah H. Cleveland, Is There Room
for the World in Our Courts?, WASH. POST, Mar. 20, 2005, at B04 (explaining that Justice
Breyer and Justice Scalia are on opposing sides regarding use of international law in con-
stitutional interpretation and that Roper was the most recent battleground).
3 Stephen Breyer, Keynote Address, American Society of International Law Proceed-
ings, 97 AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. PROC. 265, 265 (2003).
4 See id. at 266 (finding an increasing number of issues in which decisions of foreign
courts help by offering useful comparisons); see also Sujit Choudry, Globalization in
Search of Justification: Toward a Theory of Comparative Constitutional Interpretation, 74
IND. L. J. 819, 825, 836 (1999) (stating that courts "identify the normative and factual as-
sumptions underlying their own constitutional jurisprudence by engaging with compara-
ble jurisprudence of other jurisdictions ... in order to better understand their own consti-
tutional systems and jurisprudence").
5 Thompson, 487 U.S. at 869 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
6 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
7 543 U.S. 551 (2005).
3 See Elizabeth Burleson, Juvenile Execution, Terrorist Extradition, and Supreme Court
Discretion to Consider International Death Penalty Jurisprudence, 68 ALB. L. REV. 909,
922 (2005) ("[clomparative constitutionalism appears to be emerging as a means by which
the U.S. Supreme Court determines contemporary standards of decency regarding cruel
and unusual punishment and due process"); see also Thompson, 487 U.S. at 831 n.31 (pos-
iting that the Court has considered in the past the relevance of international laws in de-
termining whether a punishment is cruel and unusual).
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ing of this nation. Part II will then explain how international
law has been used for constitutional interpretation in a more
modern context. Part III will go through Lawrence and Roper,
focusing on the way the Court used international law to interpret
the Constitution. It will then discuss the implications of these
two decisions, and the contexts in which it is more appropriate
for the Court to look to international law as persuasive authority.
It will also rebut the most common arguments against using in-
ternational law in the constitutional framework. Part IV will
then discuss the broader implications for the country and the
country's credibility as a whole if we choose to isolate ourselves,
and do not recognize international law as a pertinent and impor-
tant source of constitutional authority. Finally Part V will give a
forecast for the future given the new membership on the Su-
preme Court with Chief Justice John Roberts replacing the late
Chief Justice William Rehnquist and Justice Samuel Alito re-
placing Justice Sandra Day O'Connor.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Methods of Constitutional Interpretation and Origins of
International Law as an Interpretive Guide
At the most basic level there are two schools of thought with
regard to constitutional interpretation: originalists and non-
originalists. 9 Originalists are those who look to the original in-
tent of the Constitution's framers.10 However, among orginalists
there are different beliefs with regard to the effect of history and
how to define intent.11 A strong originalist would ignore prece-
9 SeeDANIEL A. FARBER, SUZANNA SHERRY, A HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION
373-74 (West Pub. Co. 1990). Scholars often consider originalist as a subset of a textualist.
For the purposes of this article, originalists are synonymous with textualists.
10 See Steven G. Gey, A Constitutional Morphology: Text, Context, and Pretext in Consti-
tutional Interpretation, 19 ARIz. ST. L.J. 587 (1988) (defining originalists as those who "de-
fine the parameters of constitutional discourse as the 'original intent' of the Constitution's
framers").
1 See FARBER & SHERRY, supra note 9, at 374 (outlining the different "shades of belief'
among originalists); see also Daniel A. Farber, The Originialism Debate, a Guide for the
Perplexed, 49 OHIO ST. L. J. 1085, 1086-87 (1989) (positing that originalists differ in their
definitions of original intent, with some focusing on the framers' general principles and
others focusing on the framers' views of particular governmental practices).
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dent and practicality and would only look at historical evidence. 12
A moderate originalist might view other factors as important, es-
pecially when evidence of intent is not clear. 13 The minimum
originalist would look to historical evidence on open questions of
constitutional law that have not been resolved by the Supreme
Court. 14 Non-originalists would not believe that the original in-
tent of the framers constitutes binding authority, and would dis-
agree with other types of originalists on the amount of weight
that intent should be given. 15
At first glance it might seem that a non-originalist would be a
stronger supporter of the use of international law in constitu-
tional interpretation than an originalist. However, the use of in-
ternational law is in fact quite consistent with the originalist
view. An originalist looks to the original intent of the framers,
and the framers and early American Justices recognized the im-
portance and legitimacy of referring to international law. 16 In
fact, support existed that predated the founding of the nation, in
such revolutionary leaders as Alexander Hamilton, John Jay,
and James Wilson.' 7 Therefore, history should lead an originalist
toward international opinion.' 8
12 See FARBER & SHERRY, supra note 9, at 374 (explaining that the sole relevant factor
for a strong originalist is historical evidence).
13 See id. (noting that a moderate originalist would look to other factors beyond histori-
cal evidence when evidence of intent is unclear).
14 See id. (discussing the minimum originalist's vide that clear evidence of original in-
tent is controlling with respect to all open constitutional law questions that have not yet
been decided by the Supreme Court).
15 Farber, supra note 11, at 1087 ("Non-originalists share a rejection of the binding au-
thority of original intent, but this leaves room for considerable disagreement about how
much weight to give intent in comparison with other factors").
16 See Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. 419, 474 (1793) (declaring the U.S.'s duty to provide
that the laws of nations were respected and obeyed); see also Harold Hongju Koh, Interna-
tional Law as Part of Our Law, 98 AM. J. INT'L L. 43, 44 (2004) (explaining that the fram-
ers' and early Justices' recognition of the importance of compatibility of U.S. law with in-
ternational law).
17 See Jules Lobel, The Limits of Constitutional Power: Conflicts Between Foreign Policy
and International Law, 71 VA. L. REV. 1071, 1076-77 (1985) ("[s]trong support existed
among the revolutionary leadership, including Alexander Hamilton, John Jay, and James
Wilson, for the view that the government's power was limited by treaties and by funda-
mental principles of international law").
I See Koh, supra note 16, at 47 (arguing that the originalist should look towards inter-
national law like the framers themselves did); Mark C. Rahdert, 56 AM. U.L. REV. 553,
645 (2007) (recognizing the consideration of foreign law by the drafters of the United
States Constitution).
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The U.S. Supreme Court considered foreign and international
laws from the very beginning when construing American law. 19
In 1793, in Chisholm v. Georgia,20 the nation's first Chief Justice
John Jay stated that by taking its place among the nations of the
earth, the United States had "become amenable to the laws of the
nations."21 In Ware v. Hylton,22 another decision from the eight-
eenth century, Justice Wilson stated "[w]hen the United States
declared their independence, they were bound to receive the law
of nations."23 Additionally, in the 1878 case of Wilkerson v. State
of Utah,24 the Court relied on "corresponding rules that prevail in
other countries" in holding that a sentence of death by shooting
was constitutional. 25 There is also the quite famous remark by
Justice Gray in 1900 that "international law is part of our law." 26
Harold Koh has suggested that throughout history, the Su-
preme Court has looked to international law to aid in constitu-
tional interpretation in three situations: parallel rules, empirical
light and community standard.27 Parallel rules as it sounds, is
"when American legal rules seem to parallel those of other na-
tions, particularly those with similar legal and social tradi-
tions."28 International law can serve as an empirical light when
foreign courts apply standards "roughly comparable to our own
constitutional standards in roughly comparable circumstances." 29
Finally, the Court will look at international law when interpret-
19 See Cleveland, supra note 2 (finding that since nation's founding courts have looked
to international law in broad range of contexts); Koh, supra note 16, at 45 (stating that
"American courts regularly took judicial notice of both international and foreign law").
20 2 U.S. 419 (1793).
21 Id. at 474.
22 3 U.S. 199 (1796).
23 Id. at 199.
24 99 U.S. 130 (1878).
25 Id. at 134.
26 The Paquette Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900).
27 See Koh, supra note 16, at 45 (identifying three situations in which Court has regu-
larly looked to international law in constitutional interpretation); see also Joan L. Larsen,
Importing Constitutional Norms from a 'Wider Civilization": Lawrence and the Rehnquist
Court's Use of Foreign and International Law in Domestic Constitutional Interpretation,
65 OHIO ST. L.J. 1283, 1298 (2004) (explaining "three uses to which the Justices of the
Rehnquist Court have put international and comparative law in deciding constitutional
cases: an expository use, an empirical use, and a substantive use").
28 Koh, supra note 16, at 45.
29 Id. at 46 (citing Knight v. Florida, 528 U.S. 990, 997 (1999) (Breyer, J., dissenting)).
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ing terms that implicitly refer to community standards, such as
"cruel and unusual," or "due process of law."30
B. Use of International Law in Twentieth Century Case Law
Reference to international law when interpreting the Eighth
Amendment occurred periodically throughout the twentieth cen-
tury.31 In 1958, in the case of Trop v. Dulles32 the Court deter-
mined that a statute authorizing expatriation as a punishment
was beyond the war powers of Congress because denationaliza-
tion was prohibited by the Eighth Amendment. 33 The Court noted
that "[t]he civilized nations of the world are in virtual unanimity
that statelessness is not to be imposed as punishment for
crime."34 In 1977, in Coker v. Georgia35 the Court held that a sen-
tence of death for the crime of rape of an adult woman was
grossly disproportionate, and constituted 'excessive punishment'
under the Eighth Amendment. 36 In a footnote to the holding the
Court noted that due to the legislative decisions in almost all the
states and countries around the world, it would be hard to claim
that "the death penalty for rape is an indispensable part of the
criminal justice system." 37 Then in another footnote later in the
opinion, the Court referenced the Trop decision and how the plu-
rality "took pains to notice the climate of international opinion
concerning the acceptability of a particular punishment." 38
In addition to Eighth Amendment jurisprudence, reference to
international law continued to occur episodically in constitutional
30 Id.
31 See Vicki C. Jackson, Constitutional Comparisons: Convergence, Resistance, Engage-
ment, 119 HARV. L. REV. 109 n.4 (2005) (finding that after Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U.S. 130
(1879), courts considered foreign law in many cases resolving "cruel and unusual" pun-
ishment challenges); see also Stephen Arvin, Roper v. Simmons and International Law, 83
DENV. U. L. REV. 209, 224 (2005) (stating that there is "growing acceptance of interna-
tional law as source of persuasive authority in [the Court's] general approach to Constitu-
tional interpretations").
32 356 U.S. 86 (1958).
33 Id. at 101 (finding denationalization, as a punishment, to violate Eighth Amend-
ment).
-1 Id. at 102.
35 433 U.S. 584 (1977).
36 Id. at 592 (concluding that sentence of death is grossly disproportionate and excessive
punishment for crime of rape and is therefore forbidden by Eighth Amendment as cruel
and unusual punishment).
37 Id. at 592 n.4.
38 Id. at 596 n.10 (finding that in 1965 a survey of sixty major nations in the world re-
vealed that only three implemented the death penalty for rape).
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history, and between 1949 and 1970, several opinions referred to
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.39 Foreign law also
played a role in the debate over the relationship between the Bill
of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment as in Palko v. Con-
necticut.40
More recently, in the 1999 case of Knight v. Florida,41 Justice
Breyer wrote a dissent over the Court's refusal to hear the appeal
of a prisoner arguing that twenty years on death row amounted
to cruel and unusual punishment.42 In his dissent, Justice Breyer
quoted legal opinions from Jamaica, India, Zimbabwe, and the
European Court of Human Rights and noted the increasing num-
ber of courts outside the United States holding that a lengthy de-
lay in administering a lawful death penalty "renders ultimate
execution inhuman, degrading or unusually cruel."43
II. EXPANSION OF THE USE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW IN
CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION
A. Lawrence and Roper
In the 2003 case of Lawrence v. Texas44 the Court held that a
Texas statute that made it a crime for two persons of the same
sex to engage in intimate sexual conduct was unconstitutional as
applied to adult males engaging in consensual sexual acts. 45 This
decision not only explicitly overruled a prior decision, Bowers v.
39 See Jackson, supra note 31, at 111 (noting that while the Court does not address for-
eign or international law as much as other national courts, international references can
be found in a number of cases); see also Int'l Ass'n of Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740,
776-77 (1961) (Douglas, J., concurring) (discussing a debate on the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights).
40 302 U.S. 319, 325-26 n.3 (1937) (citing foreign law to demonstrate that compulsory
self-incrimination is part of the established procedure in the law of Continental Europe);
see also George L. Neuman, The Uses of International Law in Constitutional Interpreta-
tion, 98 AM. J. INT'L L. 82, 83 (2004) (stating that "foreign law played a well-known role in
the debates over the relationship between the Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amend-
ment").
41 528 U.S. 990 (1999).
42 Id. at 993 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (noting that both cases involved long delays as a re-
sult of constitutionally suspect death penalty procedures).
.43 Id. at 995-96 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (commenting that in India an appellate court
must take into account delay when deciding whether to impose the death penalty).
44 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
45 Id. at 578-79 (finding that the Due Process Clause protects intimate choices by both
married and unmarried people).
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Hardwick46 that had been decided just seventeen years before,
but also found that Bowers had been wrong when decided. 47 At
the outset the Court noted that there was "no longstanding his-
tory in this country of laws directed at homosexual conduct as a
distinct matter."48 In fact, the majority noted that American laws
targeting same sex couples were far from possessing "ancient
roots" and in fact did not develop until the last third of the 20th
century. 49 Further, the Court found that the laws and traditions
of the last half century showed an increasing awareness that lib-
erty provides protection to adults in deciding how to conduct
their lives regarding sex.5 0
The Court found it particularly noteworthy that the majority's
opinion in Bowers did not even address the authority in the other
direction, including a case, Dudgeon v. United Kingdom, 51 de-
cided by the European Court of Human Rights five years prior to
the Bowers ruling. 52 Dudgeon was based on similar facts as Bow-
ers; yet the European Court reached the opposite conclusion of
the Supreme Court in Bowers.53
In Dudgeon, the European Court had struggled with whether
two Northern Irish statutes that imposed criminal penalties for
certain homosexual acts, could be justified under the Article 8
paragraph 2 of the European Convention on Human Rights as
"necessary in a democratic society.. .for the protection of health
or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of oth-
ers."54 The Court had developed three guidelines to determining
46 478 U.S. 186 (1986), overruled by Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
47 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578 (stating Bowers was not correct when decided, is not cor-
rect today and thus is overruled).
48 Id. at 568.
49 Id. at 570.
50 See id. at 571-72 (noting substantive due process inquiry begins by examining history
and tradition of the liberty in dispute).
51 45 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1981).
52 See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 573 (discussing the Dudgeon case).
53 Id. (positing that Dudgeon is the rule in all countries that are Council of Europe
members).
54 See Dudgeon, 45 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 37. The actual text reads:
"There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right
except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society
in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the
country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals,
or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others."
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms,
Nov. 4, 1950, art. 8.
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whether a particular law relating to health and morals was justi-
fied under paragraph 2.55 First, "necessary" was understood as to
imply the existence of a pressing social need. 56 The Court looked
to how a large majority of the member states of the Council of
Europe had abolished criminal penalties for homosexual acts be-
tween consenting adults, as well as the fact that Northern Ire-
land's had long been unenforced, to conclude the Government
had not presented enough evidence to demonstrate a pressing so-
cial need. 57 However, in accordance with the second guideline,
the Court accepted the Government's bare assertion that the leg-
islation was necessary to protect the "moral ethos."5 8 Neverthe-
less, the Court still found the law failed under the third guideline
of proportionality. 59 Even assuming a change in the laws in ques-
tion would be harmful to the moral fabric of society, the Court
found that interest could not outweigh the detrimental effect of
these laws on the private lives of adults with a homosexual orien-
tation.60
Though the Lawrence Court did mention the Dudgeon opinion,
the Court clearly looked at the reaction in this nation to Bowers,
noting that the deficiencies of Bowers became apparent in our na-
tion following the decision. 61 The Court pointed to the reduction
55 See MARY ANN GLENDON, RIGHTS TALK 149 (The Free Press 1991) (stating that the
Court had developed three broad guidelines for determining whether a law was justified
under paragraph 2 of the European Convention on Human Rights); see also Dudgeon, 45
Eur. Ct. H. R. at 5 (Zekia, J., dissenting), available at http://www.worldlii.org/eu/cases
/ECHR/1981/5.html (discussing guidelines such as the fact that morals are subject to
change over time) (last visited Oct. 21, 2007).
56 Dudgeon, 45 Eur. Ct. H. R. at 51 (asserting that "necessary" in this context is not
flexible, but may only mean pressing social need); see J. Andrew Atkinson, King Arthur in
a Yankee Court: The United States Supreme Court's Use of European Law in Lawrence v.
Texas, 10 ILSA J. INT'L & COMP. L. 143, 146 (2003) (noting that the European court had
the power to determine necessary societal interests).
57 See Dudgeon, 45 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 60 (finding that the government failed its burden of
proof when it could not show public demand or pressing social need for the law).
58 Id. at 12 (Walsh, J., partially dissenting) (conceding that legislation may be needed to
protect the morals of society).
59 Id. at 60 (stating that proportionality could not be satisfied where detrimental effects
of legislation far outweigh benefits).
60 Id. at 60-61 (reasoning that the interest was not sufficient to criminalize consensual
relations between adults).
61 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 573 (2003) (explaining "[iun our own constitutional
system the deficiencies in Bowers became even more apparent in the years following its
announcement"); see Jay Michaelson, On Listening to the Kulturkampf, Or, How America
Overruled Bowers v. Hardwick, even though Romer v. Evans Didn't, 49 DUKE L.J. 1559,
1568 (2000) (positing that Bowers had "dramatic ripple effects").
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in states that prohibited homosexual conduct, the fact that those
states that did prohibit homosexual conduct did not enforce it,
and two significant American cases decided after Bowers,
Planned Parenthood of Southeastern PA v. Casey62 and Romer v.
Evans63 as evidence of the inadequacy of Bowers.64 In Casey, the
Court found that "[o]ur law affords constitutional protection to
personal decisions relating to marriage, procreation, contracep-
tion, family relationships, child rearing, and education."65 In Ro-
mer, the Court invalidated a law that deprived homosexuals, les-
bians or bisexuals protection under state anti-discrimination
laws.66
The Court did acknowledge the principle of stare decisis, but
noted it is not an "inexorable command."67 The majority found it
important that the Bowers holding had not induced detrimental
reliance which would counsel against overruling, especially when
sound reasons existed to do so.68 Although there were several
reasons noted by the Court for overruling Bowers, significantly
the majority opinion, written by Justice Kennedy stated that "to
the extent Bowers relied on values we share with a wider civiliza-
tion, it should be noted that the reasoning and holding in Bowers
have been rejected elsewhere."69 The majority then went on to
note that the European Court of Human Rights had not followed
Bowers, but its own decision in Dudgeon, and that other nations
had taken action affirming the right of homosexual adults to en-
gage in intimate consensual conduct. 70 The majority concluded
that the right petitioners sought to be recognized in this case was
"accepted as an integral part of human freedom in many other
countries "71
The dissent, written by Justice Scalia took the majority to task
for overruling Bowers, a decision rendered just seventeen years
62 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
63 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
64 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 573 (providing evidence that the deficiencies of Bowers became
apparent to the states referenced in Bowers).
65 Casey, 505 U.S. at 851.
6 Romer, 517 U.S. at 635 (concluding that the Colorado statute was beyond the state's
legislative authority).
67 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 577.
68 Id. at 577 (noting that the Bowers decision had not induced detrimental reliance
comparable to other instances where recognized individual rights are involved).
69 Id. at 576.
70 Id. (explaining that the United States shares values common to other nations).
71 Id. at 577.
[Vol. 22:3
ENRICHING CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION
ago. In regards to the majority's reference to international law,
though Justice Scalia stated it was dicta, he noted it was danger-
ous because "this Court should not impose foreign moods, fads, or
fashions on Americans." 72
Two years later, in the 2005 case of Roper v. Simmons,73 the
Court held that the execution of a person who was under the age
of eighteen at the time the crime was committed was unconstitu-
tional under the eighth and fourteenth amendments. 74 Similar to
the Lawrence decision, it explicitly overruled a fairly recent case,
Stanford v. Kentucky,75 decided only sixteen years prior. Justice
Kennedy again wrote the majority opinion and began by noting
the finding of the Missouri Supreme Court that since the Stan-
ford case,
a national consensus has developed against the execution of
juvenile offenders, as demonstrated by the fact that eighteen
states now bar such executions for juveniles, that twelve
other states bar executions altogether, that no state has low-
ered its age of execution below 18 since Stanford, that five
states have legislatively or by case law raised or established
the minimum age at 18, and that the imposition of the juve-
nile death penalty has become truly unusual over the last
decade.7 6
Justice Kennedy went on to compare the present case to Atkins
v. Virginia,77 in which the Court had found the execution of the
mentally retarded to be unconstitutional based on the evolving
standards of decency. 78 Justice Kennedy acknowledged that the
nation's rate of change in reducing the frequency of the juvenile
death penalty has been slower than that demonstrated in Atkins
72 Id. at 598 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing Foster v. Florida, 537 U.S. 990 (2002) (Tho-
mas, J., concurring)).
73 543 U.S. 551 (2005).
74 Id. at 578 ("the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments forbid imposition of the death
penalty on offenders who were under the age of 18 when their crimes were committed").
75 492 U.S. 361 (1989). The Stanford court affirmed a decision of the Supreme Court of
Missouri holding that imposing capital punishment on a 16 or 17 year old did not consti-
tute cruel and unusual punishment under the eight amendment.
76 Roper, 543 U.S. at 559-60.
77 536 U.S. 304 (2002).
78 Roper, 543 U.S. at 563-64 (explaining that in Atkins, the Court noted the evolving
standards of decency and comparing the evidence of a national consensus in Atkins to the
evidence here).
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of abolishing the death penalty for the mentally retarded.7 9 How-
ever, Justice Kennedy concluded that "any difference between
this case and Atkins with respect to the pace of abolition [was]
counterbalanced by the consistent direction of the change."80 Jus-
tice Kennedy then went on to discuss the difference between
adults and juveniles under age eighteen which demonstrated ju-
veniles could not be considered the worst offenders.81
Finally, Justice Kennedy ended his opinion by addressing the
fact that "[t]he United States is the only country in the world
that continues to give official sanction to the juvenile death pen-
alty."8 2 He was quick to note that though this fact was not con-
trolling and the task of interpreting the Eighth Amendment re-
mains the responsibility of the Court, since the decision in Trop
v. Dulles8 3, the Court had looked to other country's laws in inter-
preting the Eighth Amendment.8 4 He then cited to briefs from
foreign and international organizations for the proposition that
Article 37 of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of
Children, which every country in the world besides the United
States and Somalia had ratified, expressly prohibited capital
punishment for crimes committed by juveniles under the age of
eighteen.8 5 Justice Kennedy drove home the point by again stat-
ing "it is fair to say that the United States now stands alone in a
world that has turned its face against the juvenile death pen-
alty."8 6
Justice Scalia dissented, strongly disagreeing with the major-
ity that a national consensus against the juvenile death penalty
had developed.87 In fact, he found that the views of U.S. citizens
79 Id. at 565 (stating the rate of change in abolishing the juvenile death penalty has
been slower than that of abolishing the death penalty for the mentally retarded).
so Id. at 566.
8' Id. at 569-76 (discussing the many differences between juveniles under age eighteen
and adults).
82 Id. at 575.
83 356 U.S. 86 (1958).
84 Roper, 543 U.S. at 575 (stating that foreign law is not controlling but has been re-
ferred to in Eighth Amendment jurisprudence since Trop v. Dulles).
85 Id. at 576 (noting both Article 37's express prohibition on capital punishment for
crimes committed by juveniles under 18 and parallel prohibitions in other significant in-
ternational covenants).
86 Id. at 577.
87 Id. at 609 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing "[w]ords have no meaning if the views of
less than 50% of death penalty States can constitute a national consensus ... Our previ-
ous cases have required overwhelming opposition to a challenged practice, generally over
a long period of time").
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had been pushed to the side, while the views of the international
community and had taken center stage.88 He went so far as to ac-
cuse the court of sophistry, in enacting foreign law when it agrees
with one's own thinking and ignoring it otherwise.8 9
Although Justice O'Connor dissented in the Court's ruling be-
cause she did not believe that there was a true national consen-
sus against the juvenile death penalty, she disagreed with Jus-
tice Scalia's assertion in his dissent that international law had no
place in Eighth Amendment jurisprudence. 90 She defended the
use of international law noting that in the last half century, the
Court has frequently referred to international law when assess-
ing the evolving standards of decency.9 1 Even while recognizing
American law is distinctive in many respects, she still stated,
This Nation's evolving understanding of human dignity
certainly is neither wholly isolated from, nor inherently at
odds with, the values prevailing in other countries. On the
contrary, we should not be surprised to find congruence
between domestic and international values, especially
where the international community has reached clear
agreement-expressed in international law or in the domes-
tic laws of individual countries-that a particular form of
punishment is inconsistent with fundamental human
rights.92
B. Implications of Lawrence and Roper
The Lawrence and Roper decision are highly significant deci-
sions in terms of constitutional jurisprudence for several reasons.
First, both decisions demonstrate the proper use of international
law as persuasive authority in interpreting phrases such as
"evolving standards of decency," "cruel and unusual punish-
ment," and "due process" that involve the entire world commu-
88 Id. at 622 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("[tihough the views of our own citizens are essen-
tially irrelevant to the Court's decision today, the views of other countries and the so-
called international community take center stage").
89 Id. at 627 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (positing that to invoke alien law only when it
agrees with one's own thinking is sophistry).
90 Id. at 604 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (disagreeing with Scalia's dissent and arguing
that the Court has referred to international law in assessing evolving standards of de-
cency).
91 Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (finding that "[o]ver the course of nearly half a century,
the Court has consistently referred to foreign and international law as relevant").
92 Id. at 605 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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nity.93 The text of the Constitution does not define these terms
and some external interpretive tool is necessary at times to re-
solve constitutional questions. 94 By using international law to
bring meaning to these terms, the Court implicitly recognized the
legitimacy of the practice.
Second, the decisions show that the use of international law in
constitutional interpretation is not "the Draconian usurpation of
US sovereignty envisaged by the critics."95 In fact, when used
properly constitutional law can be seen as "a site of engagement
between domestic law and international or foreign legal sources
and practices."96 In other words international law is not treated
as binding, but the constitution's interpreters are not forced to
"put on blinders that exclude foreign legal sources."9 7 In Law-
rence, the use of international law was a modest aid in constitu-
tional interpretation, 98 while in Roper the Court first looked to
the text of the Constitution along with American history, tradi-
tion and precedent and then undertook an extensive analysis of
U.S. concepts of "cruel and unusual punishment" before turning
to foreign laws.99
Finally, Lawrence and especially Roper are significant because
they represent a growing awareness by the Court of the validity
93 See Cleveland, supra note 2 (noting that general concepts incorporated into Constitu-
tion such as "liberty" and "cruel and unusual punishment" invoke fundamental values of
international community); Yitzchok Segal, The Death Penalty and the Debate over the
U.S. Supreme Court's Citation of Foreign and International Law, 33 FORDHAM URB. L.J.
1421, 1451 (2006) (discussing Court's use of citing international law as "objective indica-
tor[ ] of society decency standards").
94 See Charles Hobson, Culpability and the Death Penalty: The Intersection of Law and
Psychology, 11 WIDENER L. REV. 23, 26-27 (2003) ("phrase 'cruel and unusual punish-
ment'... did not have a static meaning"); Tamela R. Hughlett, International Law: The Use
of International Law as a Guide to Interpretation of the United States Constitution, 45
OKLA. L. REV. 169, 180 (1992) (finding fact that Bill of Rights does not define certain
rights is first reason for courts to use international law as interpretive guide).
95 Sean D. Murphy, The Law of the Lands: Why Courts Look Overseas, BOSTON GLOBE,
Jun. 5, 2005, at D12, available at 2005 WLNR 8985892.
9 Jackson, supra note 31, at 114.
97 Id.
98 See Neuman, supra note 40, at 89 (positing that Supreme Court's invocation of inter-
national law in aid of constitutional interpretation is modest); Mark Tushnet, 'A Decent
Respect to the Opinions of Mankind" Referring to Foreign Law to Express American Na-
tionhood, 69 ALB. L. REV. 809, 809 (2006) (noting Court's referral to foreign law in Law-
rence did not give foreign law "any degree of authority").
99 See Murphy, supra note 95 (explaining that Court fully accepted that Constitution's
prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment should be interpreted according to text);
Segal, supra note 93, at 1438 (highlighting Court first finding national consensus before
turning to foreign and international law).
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of international law. 100 In fact, "Lawrence represents the first
time the Supreme Court has cited foreign case law in the process
of overruling an American constitutional precedent." 10 1 Together
both cases signal recognition by the Court that it does not make
sense to reach decisions in a vacuum, especially considering it
has a "common legal heritage, tradition, and history with many
foreign constitutional systems.1' 02 As Justice Kennedy noted in
the Lawrence opinion, when the Supreme Court issued the opin-
ion of Bowers v. Hardwick, there was no mention of the Dudgeon
v. United Kingdom case that had just been decided by the Euro-
pean Court of Human Rights, even by the side it would have
helped. 10 3 By not mentioning the Dudgeon case, the Justices and
especially Bowers' lawyer ignored a valuable resource. 10 4 The
Dudgeon case yielded six opinions from some of the world's lead-
ing jurists. Even if it would not have changed the result in Bow-
ers, it could have clarified the issues and broadened perspectives,
as well as improved the quality of reasoning, which would have
helped to place the opinion on more solid ground.10 5 For example,
the European Court explained how its holding grew out of guide-
lines developed in prior decisions, while the "cryptic" Bowers de-
100 See Stephen Arvin, supra note 31, at 210 (positing that Roper stands for growing ap-
preciation of validity of international law); see also Elizabeth Burleson, supra note 8, at
921 (noting that Roper reaffirmed relevance of international law and practice in U.S. con-
stitutional jurisprudence).
101 William N. Eskridge, Jr., Development -- United States: Lawrence v. Texas and the
Imperative of Comparative Constitutionalism, 2 INT'L J. CONST. L. 555 (2004).
102 Koh, supra note 16, at 47 (finding it makes little constitutional sense for Supreme
Court to decide cases in vacuum since U.S. has never been hermitically sealed legal sys-
tem).
103 See Jeffrey Toobin, Swing Shift: How Anthony Kennedy's passion for foreign law
could change the Supreme Court, THE NEW YORKER, Sept. 12, 2005, available at
http://www.newyorker.com/fact/content/articles/050912fa-fact (quoting Justice Kennedy
as stating that, though Dudgeon v. United Kingdom had just been decided exactly way
defendants in Bowers wanted the Court to go, "the lawyers didn't even cite it in their
briefs"); see also GLENDON, supra note 55, at 148 (explaining that Dudgeon case was ig-
nored by lawyers on both sides of Bowers case, as well as majority and dissenting judges).
104 See GLENDON, supra note 55, at 152 (finding that in Bowers' case Supreme Court
Justices and plaintiffs attorney ignored valuable and readily available resource); Sir Syd-
ney Kentridge, Comparative Law in Constitutional Adjudication: The South African Ex-
perience, 80 TUL. L. REV. 245, 254 (2005) (stating "Dudgeon case was not mentioned" in
Bowers case).
105 See Shirley S. Abrahamson & Michael J. Fischer, All the World's a Courtroom: Judg-
ing in the New Millennium, 26 HOFSTRA L. REV. 273, 289 (1997) (highlighting that opin-
ions in Dudgeon case had many comparative law references); GLENDON, supra note 55, at
152 (explaining how six Dudgeon opinions, issued by world's leading jurists, could have
improved Bowers decision).
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cision, looked more like the mere product of majority vote. 10 6 The
principal writers of Bowers resorted more to "bald assertion than
principled justifications."' 10 7 In fact, if the American Justices in
the Bowers case had read the Dudgeon case, they might have
been shocked to discover the similarity in the European Court's
decision making techniques with the great American judge's tra-
dition of judicial candor and craftsmanship, as practiced by great
judges such as Robert Jackson, John Marshall Harlan, Henry
Friendly and Learned Hand.108 According to Justice Kennedy,
this ignorance of foreign decisions "would never happen today,"
because even though we know foreign decisions are not binding
on us, "we know we have to be aware of what's going on in the
world."10 9
In addition, Justice Kennedy himself has pointed to the greater
amount of available information from different legal systems.110
The two main legal databases in the United States carry opinions
from dozens of countries.' It would constitute "willful igno-
rance" on the part of the Justices to not be aware of the jurispru-
dence in other countries.1 12 As Ann Marie Slaughter, the dean of
the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs at
Princeton put it: "The opinions are out there, easy to get, and the
briefs are being filed. If the Justices didn't cite them, it would be
like pretending the rest of the world didn't exist."11 3
106 See Abrahamson & Fischer, supra note 105, at 289 (recognizing Dudgeon court's care
in its decision that was lacking in Bowers); see also GLENDON, supra note 55, at 156.
107 GLENDON, supra note 55, at 157.
108 See Abrahamson & Fischer, supra note 105, at 289-90 (explaining how courts in
Dudgeon and Bowers made their respective decisions); see also GLENDON, supra note 55,
at 156-57.
109 Toobin, supra note 103.
110 See id. ("judges' use of foreign law today is a response to the availability of global
sources of information"); see also Tony Mauro, U.S. Supreme Court vs. The World: 'Are We
So Arrogant That We Think We Have Nothing to Learn from Judges and Lawmakers
Around the World Who Have Faced the Same Issues We Face?, USA TODAY, Jun. 20, 2005,
at A15 (highlighting Justice Kennedy's progression from rejecting international law as
"too remote and unknown to American judges" to acceptance of the potential to learn from
such law).
- See Toobin, supra note 103 ("two most frequently consulted legal databases in the
[U.S.], Lexis and Westlaw, carry foreign opinions from dozens of countries"); see, e.g.,
www.lexis.com (having "Global Legal" database carrying a wide-variety of international
legal sources).
112 Toobin, supra note 103 (arguing "it would require almost willful ignorance on the
part of Supreme Court Justice's not to be aware of judicial activity in other countries").
113 Id.
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C. When International Law is Most Applicable
The legitimacy regarding the use of international law will de-
pend on several factors, the most obvious being the issue being
decided. 114 Certain rights are written into the Constitution and
do not need to be interpreted, such as the requirement that the
president be thirty-five years old or there be a grand jury for fed-
eral prosecutions. 115 However the Constitution contains many
vague terms and reasonable people can disagree on the interpre-
tation.1 16 In construing issues that are open to interpretation,
such as whether executing a person for a crime committed when
the person was under the age of 18 constitutes cruel and unusual
punishment, it makes sense to look to how other jurisdictions
which dealt with the same issue, resolved it.117 If other jurisdic-
tions have already examined these issues, "then our commitment
to the pursuit of justice should lead us to examine the end prod-
uct of their labors for guidance."118 Further, critics of due process
jurisprudence who find it rests on subjective whims of the jus-
tices should welcome justices looking to other authority, so as to
be sure they are not reading their own views into the open-ended
provisions of the Constitution.11 9
114 See Jackson, supra note 31, at 125 (discussing various factors going to the legitimacy
of applying international law including the "specificity and history of our constitutional
text, the degree to which the issue is genuinely unsettled, and the strength of other inter-
pretive sources"); see also Robert C. Bird, Procedural Challenges to Environmental Regu-
lation of Space Debris, 40 AM. BUS. L.J. 635, 664 (2003) (stating "[a] rule has legitimacy in
international law to the extent it possesses four distinct properties - determinacy, sym-
bolic validation, coherence, and adherence").
115 See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1 ("No person ... shall be eligible to the office of the Presi-
dent... who shall not have attained the age of thirty five years"); Jackson, supra note 31,
at 125 (noting that "[w]hatever the foreign practice, the U.S. Constitution requires a
grand jury for federal prosecutions").
116 See Hughlett, supra note 94, at 180 ("[tlhe provisions of the Constitution are often
vague and, even reasonable people could disagree on how the Supreme Court should in-
terpret the Constitution"); see also Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., Article: Bush v. Gore: Looking at
Baker v. Carr in a Conservative Mirror, 18 CONST. COMMENT. 359, 380 n.127 (2001) (de-
scribing "the Constitution is often extremely vague" and asserting "that reasonable people
disagree about what it means" (citation omitted)).
117 See Jeremy Waldron, Foreign Law and the Modern Ius Gentium, 119 HARV. L. REV.
129, 140 (2005) (concluding that when determining the constitutionality of open ques-
tions, we can use "all the help we can get").
118 Id.
119 See Eskridge, supra note 101, at 557 (stating that "[o]ne way for a judge to be more
certain that she is not just reading her own views into the Constitution's open-textured
provisions is to see if differently situated judges elsewhere in the world are reaching the
same normative judgment"); Sarah Ramsey and Daan Braveman, Articles: "Let Them
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Looking to international law as an interpretive source is espe-
cially appropriate regarding issues of human rights.120 In the
words of Justice Kennedy,
Why should world opinion care that the American Ad-
ministration wants to bring freedom to oppressed peo-
ples? Is that not because there's some underlying com-
mon mutual interest, some underlying common shared
idea, some underlying common shared aspiration, under-
lying unified concept of what human dignity means?121
In essence, there are some rights deemed so fundamental that
they transcend national borders. Though not every issue will
have a clear international consensus as was the case in Roper,1 22
it still makes sense to look to those jurisdictions that have dealt
with a particular issue and examine the end product of their la-
bor. 123 Justice Breyer stated that foreign judges are "dealing with
texts that more and more protect basic human rights. If here I
have a human being called a judge in a different country dealing
with a similar problem, why don't I read what he says, if it's
similar enough? Maybe I'll learn something."1 24
Starve". Government's Obligation to Children in Poverty, 68 TEMP. L. REV. 1607, 1645
(1995) (explaining that international law may be used as a "guiding principle" in inter-
preting the U.S. Constitution and such use is relevant when determining issue related to
the enforcement of treaties and "customary law").
120 See Ruth Bader Ginsburg & Deborah Jones Merritt, Affirmative Action: An Interna-
tional Human Rights Dialogue, 21 CARDOZo L. REV. 253, 282 (1999) ("comparative analy-
sis emphatically is relevant to the task of interpreting constitutions and enforcing human
rights"); Kathleen M. Kedian, Note, Customary International Law and International Hu-
man Rights Litigation in United States Courts: Revitalizing the Legacy of the Paquette
Habana, 40 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1395, 1398 (1999) (noting that "[an increase in the
number of international human rights cases reaching federal courts, and the recent trend
toward loosening the requirements of and decreasing the time necessary for establishing
customary norms, have intensified the customary international law debate and imposed
urgency on the need to resolve it").
121 Toobin, supra note 103.
122 See Jackson, supra note 31, at 127 ("[c]ases like Roper, with so strong a consensus in
international and foreign law and practice prohibiting the juvenile death penalty, are
likely to be rare").
123 See Waldron, supra note 117, at 140 (positing that the "accumulated legal wisdom of
mankind can still offer something," even when dealing with a case that is "peculiarly
American"); see also Toobin, supra note 103 (quoting Justice Kennedy who stated: "[i]f we
are asking the rest of the world to adopt our idea of freedom, it does seem to me that there
may be some mutuality there, that other nations and other peoples can define and inter-
pret freedom in a way that's at least instructive to us").
124 Toobin, supra note 103.
[Vol. 22:3
ENRICHING CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION
The second factor that will help to determine whether the use
is appropriate is the persuasive value of the source. It is impor-
tant to look at whether the source shares common values, such as
democracy and freedom. 125 As Koh explains, those who advocate
the use of international law in constitutional interpretation are
not advocating that the courts defer to a "global nose count."126
Instead, the point is to look to the practices of other mature de-
mocracies for relevant evidence of how to construe these open
ended terms. 127
Finally, support from international sources should only be used
when it has reached a certain level of legitimacy. 128 This can be
shown through codification or an international agreement such
as the United Nations Convention on the Rights of Children used
by the Court in Roper. It was not necessary for the United States
to have ratified the agreement because it still provided evidence
of concrete human rights norms accepted by many other na-
tions."1 29 Legitimacy of an international source can also be shown
by a general practice or prohibition. Justice Harlan explained
125 See Jackson, supra note 31, at 125 (finding that countries which share our commit-
ment to human rights, democracy and the rule of law roughly comparable to ours are
likely to have more positive persuasive value); see also Thomas M. Franck, Human Rights
International Law Symposium: Article: The Democratic Entitlement, 29 U. RICH. L. REV. 1,
8-9 (1994) ("[a]s in our national jurisprudence, the soil from which international law
springs is the loam of widely-shared social values. Participatory democracy is becoming
such a common value of humanity and it is to this value that international law is already
starting to respond").
126 Koh, supra note 16, at 56.
127 See id. (suggesting that the most relevant evidence is that of mature democracies).
But see, e.g., Gary Bauer, Disorder in our High Court, USA TODAY, Mar. 21, 2005, at A23
(arguing that "[u]nder no circumstances should laws passed by the British Parliament,
the French National Assembly, the German Bundestag or the High Court of Zimbabwe be
a factor in deciding what is a permissible decision by the American people in our own self-
governance").
128 See Sarah H. Cleveland, Our International Constitution, 31 YALE J. INT'L L. 1, 9-10
(2006) (positing that before applying international law to a constitutional issue, one of the
factors the court should consider is "how uniformly accepted and well defined the interna-
tional norm is and whether states have complied with it in practice"); Hughlett, supra
note 94, at 183-84 (asserting that international law should not be used unless it can be
shown that it has reached the level of international custom, either through a showing of
general or consistent prohibition or practice by countries, or as evidenced by international
agreements).
129 See Hughlett, supra note 94, at 183 ("[i]nternational agreements evidence concrete
human rights norms accepted by most nations, whether or not the nations ratify or even
sign the agreements"); see also David Weissbrodt, Execution of Juvenile Offenders by the
United States Violates International Human Rights Law, 3 AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POLy' 339,
348 (1988) (commenting "[tihe greater the number of parties to a treaty, the greater the
inference that it rises to the level of customary international law").
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that "the greater the degree of codification or consensus concern-
ing a particular area of international law, the more appropriate it
is for the judiciary to render decisions regarding it".130
D. Why it is not "totally inappropriate" to use International Law
Critics of the use of international law often claim one of two
things: either (1) the whole idea of using international law is
wrong or (2) the use of international law is not necessarily wrong
but it is being used selectively, haphazardly or opportunistically,
and therefore is an opportunity for a Judge to infuse his or her
own views into the Constitution.
Justice Scalia stated in his dissent in Roper that "the basic
premise of the Court's argument-that American law should con-
form to the laws of the rest of the world-ought to be rejected out
of hand."131 However, in neither Roper nor Lawrence did the ma-
jority argue or imply that the American law must conform to the
laws of the rest of the world. In both cases, the use of foreign law
was used merely as persuasive authority as opposed to binding
precedent. Further, Justice Scalia's comment that "[w]e don't
have the same moral and legal framework as the rest of the
world and never have,"132 is simply not true when it comes to cer-
tain fundamental rights in which there has been a growing
world-wide consensus. 33 It also ignores the fact that the U.S. has
ties with international and foreign law because our courts have
relied upon both from the very beginning of our nation. 134
In Lawrence, Justice Scalia found that it was wrong for the
Court to impose "foreign moods, fads, or fashions on Americans,"
however, established international norms regarding human
130 Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 428 (1964).
131 543 U.S. 551, 624 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
132 Charles Lane, The Court Is Open for Discussion; AU Students Get Rare Look At Jus-
tices' Legal Sparring, WASH. POST, Jan. 14, 2005, at A01 (quoting Justice Scalia).
133 See Breyer, supra note 3, at 266 (stating that increasing number of globalized issues,
such as the ever stronger consensus on the importance of protecting basic human rights,
allows for foreign law and decisions in foreign courts to help with domestic issues, includ-
ing constitutional issues, by providing points of comparison).
134 See Murphy, supra note 95 (responding to critics regarding the use of international
law by explaining the US does have an inherent relationship to international and foreign
law).
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rights can hardly be demeaned to the level of a fad or fashion. 135
Jeremy Waldron analogized the use of international law in U.S.
decision-making to that of science and of scientific problem solv-
ing.136 According to Waldron, just as it would be ridiculous for
public health authorities to only look to American science when a
new disease arises, so is it to ignore international law when deal-
ing with difficult legal problems in America, such as the juvenile
death penalty. 13 7 It also ignores the plain fact that Judges are
forced to make judgment calls regarding Constitutional terms
that are vague and undefined.
Another common critique of international law is one Justice
Scalia mentioned in Roper, the invoking of international law op-
portunistically. 138 This critique has merit because as Justice
Scalia rightly pointed out, foreign law was invoked in a homo-
sexual sodomy case, but there was "not a whisper about foreign
law in the series of abortion cases."' 39 International law should
be invoked in an even handed manner because as is the case with
most theories, it is capable of misuse. Justice Breyer acknowl-
edged this but he also he stated he hoped that all judges "would
refer to materials that support positions that the judge disfavors
as well as those that he favors."'140 He then discussed his dissent
in Knight v. Florida,'4 ' in which he had cited international law
that supported his position, as well as opposed it.142
135 See Hughlett, supra note 94, at 192 (noting that international law provides an objec-
tive standard); Waldron, supra note 117, at 144 (positing that referring to foreign law
does not simply look to foreign fads).
136 See Waldron, supra note 117, at 144 (comparing the use of foreign law to that of the
establishment of scientific theories in that solutions to problems in the law may change
over the years as there is progress).
137 Id. at 143 (showing the similarities between scientific and legal comparisons on an
international scope).
138 See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 627 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("[t]o invoke
alien law when it agrees with one's own thinking, and ignore it otherwise, is not reasoned
decisionmaking, but sophistry"); Waldron, supra note 117, at 130 (noting the argument
that the use of foreign law is opportunistic).
139 The Relevance of Foreign Legal Materials in U.S. Constitutional Cases: A Conversa-
tion Between Justice Antonin Scalia and Justice Stephen Breyer, 3 INT'L J. CONST. L. 519,
521 (2005) [hereinafter Scalia-Breyer Debate] (arguing that justices use foreign law selec-
tively, Scalia stated, "[w]hen it agrees with what the justices would like the case to say,
we use the foreign law, and when it doesn't agree we don't use it").
140 Id. at 523.
141 528 U.S. 990, 993-99 (1999) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
142 See Scalia-Breyer Debate, supra note 139, at 527-28 (explaining his dissent in Knight
v. Florida, where he referred to decisions by the Supreme Court of India, the Supreme
Court of Canada, certain United Nations determinations, and a case from Zimbabwe).
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Even assuming Justice Scalia is right, a theory should not be
rejected because it is being used opportunistically in certain in-
stances, when the theory is capable of being used in a construc-
tive and appropriate manner. 143 Jeremy Waldron made the point
that the same critique could be made of the doctrine of stare de-
cisis, as Justices can choose to follow precedent for the wrong
reasons and invoke it in an opportunistic manner. 144 However,
simply because stare decisis can be used in an opportunistic fash-
ion at times, does not justify rejecting it completely. 145 Similarly,
the use of international law should not be rejected because of the
possibility of abuse.
Furthermore, it is important to acknowledge that the use of in-
ternational law necessarily has to be somewhat selective, because
it would only make sense to make comparisons with other ma-
ture democracies and not those that lag behind developmen-
tally.146 Koh exclaimed that the critics "bizarrely ... assume that
United States judges should construe a national bill of rights
that the framers thought was the model for the world in light of
the world's worst practices."'147
The best answer to critics however, is that when utilized prop-
erly, the use of international law can actually decrease a Judge's
143 See Cleveland, supra note 128, at 96-97 (recognizing argument that use of interna-
tional law can be "sloppy, misguided, and even opportunistic" and noting this problem
with any interpretive mechanism); Waldron, supra note 117, at 130-31 (positing that fol-
lowing and departing from precedent can be unprincipled and opportunistic, but it does
not follow that theory of stare decisis should be rejected, just as a theory of citing to for-
eign law should not be rejected solely because it has been cited opportunistically); see also
id. (stating international law should not be rejected so long as international standards
used involve a "determined effort to accurately construe and apply international law and
to meaningfully validate claims of widespread state practice").
144 See Waldron, supra note 117, at 130-31 (asserting that stare decisis can also be in-
voked opportunistically); see also Cleveland, supra note 128, at 102-03 (noting that "com-
mon law, historical sources, social science and scientific data, law and economics theory,
pragmatic policy concerns, and judge-made rules of construction, including principles of
stare decisis" are all interpretive sources not produced by democratic lawmaking and are
subject to abuse).
145 See Waldron, supra note 117, at 130-31 (stating that we should not reject the theory
of stare decisis just because following or departing from precedent can be opportunistic).
146 See Koh, supra note 16, at 56 (noting that "mature democracies.., constitute the
most relevant evidence of what Eighth Amendment jurisprudence calls the 'evolving
standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society"' (quoting Trop v. Dul-
les, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958))).
147 Id.
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subjectivity. 148 Those who claim that the use of international law
is an opportunity for Judges to infuse their own beliefs into the
Constitution fail to recognize that vague Constitutional terms of-
ten require a judge to exercise discretion and make judgment
calls. Citing an international norm or law for their interpreta-
tion of a vague clause such as due process can actually prevent
judges from infusing their own beliefs and preferences.1 49 Justice
Breyer noted that when a judge looks to international law it is
"not to impose his own moral views, but for a more objective
standard."150 As much as it might vex the critics, comparison to
international law and the law of foreign nations to at least some
degree is inevitable in today's jurisprudence.1 51 Judges should not
have to pretend that they close their eyes to the world, nor
should we want them to.
III. BROADER IMPLICATIONS
Thankfully, it is no longer true that "the United
States.. .remains sadly isolated from the rapidly developing cor-
pus of international human rights law,"1 52 as demonstrated by
both the Lawrence and Roper cases. However, the United States
courts are far ways off from other courts which cite international
sources of law with great frequency. 53 In 1988, Anthony Lester
noted that the courts in Europe and elsewhere have recognized
the "persuasive authority of legal principles developed by the
United States federal judiciary"1 54 and advocated that it would be
beneficial for the United States to reciprocate. Lester found it
regrettable that for the United States, human rights have been
"for export only" and submitted that it could have many undesir-
148 See Justice Michael Kirby, International Law-The Impact on National Constitutions,
21 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 327, 349 (2006) (finding proper use of international law can actu-
ally decrease subjectivity).
149 See Hughlett, supra note 94, at 201 (explaining that using international law de-
creases a Judge's subjectivity).
150 Scalia-Breyer Debate, supra note 139, at 527.
151 See Jackson, supra note 31, at 119 (stating that comparison is inevitable).
152 Anthony Lester, The Overseas Trade in the American Bill of Rights, 88 COLUM. L.
REV. 537, 539 (1988).
153 See Neuman, supra note 40, at 86 (noting that other countries' constitutional courts
voluntarily consider international human rights norms in interpreting constitutional
rights and providing the example of the German Constitutional Court and the Supreme
Court of Canada).
154 Lester, supra note 152, at 543.
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able consequences, such as diminishing American influence
abroad.155 Mary Ann Glendon echoed similar thoughts in 1991,
when she discussed the implications of America being only an
exporter of ideas.156 She emphasized that our rights traditions
and struggle to bring rights to all Americans have inspired oth-
ers.
In closing our own eyes and ears to the development of
* rights ideas elsewhere, our most grievous loss is not
the influence of our legal ideas, but rather the kind of
assistance in the never-ending project of revitalizing
and renewing our own rights traditions that can be
gained from observing the successes and failures of
others.157
Since Lester and Glendon's observations, there have been signs
of change and hopefully the Lawrence and Roper decisions are
signs of greater movement toward recognition of international
law as a valid tool for constitutional interpretation. Just as Su-
preme Court decisions have been plentiful sources for human
rights doctrines in other countries, now the favor can be recipro-
cated. 158 As Chief Justice Rehnquist stated extrajudicially, "now
that constitutional law is solidly grounded in so many coun-
tries ... it's time the U.S. courts began looking to the decisions of
other constitutional courts to aid in their own deliberative proc-
ess." 159 His words have been echoed by several other Justices, in-
cluding Sandra Day O'Connor who has stated that "conclusions
reached by other countries and by the international community
should at times constitute persuasive authority."160
155 Id. at 561 (commenting on inconsistency between America's willingness to contribute
to human rights globally while simultaneously refusing to consider outside sources in its
own judicial interpretations).
156 GLENDON, supra note 55, at 170 (discussing the implications of this practice).
157 Id.
158 See Lester, supra note 152, at 543 (stating English courts and others have "acknowl-
edged the persuasive authority of legal principles developed by the United States federal
judiciary"); Neuman, supra note 40, at 87 (finding that the Supreme Court has been a
prestigious source of individual rights doctrines and argumentation in the global commu-
nity).
159 Jackson, supra note 31, at 112 (quoting William H. Rehnquist, Foreword to
DEFINING THE FIELD OF COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, at vii-viii (Vicki C. Jackson
& Mark Tushnet eds., 2002).
160 Sandra Day O'Connor, Keynote Address, Proceedings of the Ninety-Sixth Annual
Meeting of the American Society of International Law, 96 AM. SOCY INT'L L. PROC. 348,
350 (2002); see Sandra Day O'Connor, Broadening Our Horizons: Why American Judges
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However, if the United States instead follows a path of isola-
tionism based on a notion of the exceptional character of the
American constitution, the ramifications could be severe. We live
in an interdependent world and "for any nation consciously to ig-
nore global standards not only would ensure constant frictions
with the rest of the world, but also would diminish that nation's
ability to invoke those international rules that served its own na-
tional purposes." 161 It also incites attacks of parochialism and
could undermine the U.S. influence abroad over the development
of global human rights. 162
Beyond the fact that declaring other law irrelevant to our Con-
stitution makes "our Constitution appear irrelevant to the
world,"163 to disregard international law is to ignore a legitimate
and helpful tool for constitutional interpretation. The Constitu-
tion is rightly praised for its concern with individual human
rights,1 64 however due to the lack of definitions in certain parts,
some external guides are necessary.1 65 Richard Posner, a well re-
spected federal court of appeals judge candidly admitted, that
when deciding a novel constitutional case, there is nothing else to
draw on other than "discretionary judgment" because "the consti-
tutional text and history, and the pronouncements in past opin-
ions, do not speak clearly."1 66 International law can in appropri-
ate situations serve as one persuasive authority for interpreting
vague or unclear points in the Constitution. It also provides Jus-
tices with "a road map of consequences that are likely to follow
their recognition of rights for a previously excluded minority."167
and Lawyers Must Learn About Foreign Law, INT'L JUD. OBSERVER 2 (1997) (advocating
the consideration of the conclusions reached by other countries and by the international
community in U.S. courts).
16, Koh, supra note 16, at 44.
162 See id. at 56 (discussing potential damage if U.S. courts ignore foreign precedent).
163 Neuman, supra note 40, at 87 (citing Claire L'Heureux-Dube, The Importance of Dia-
logue: Globalization and the International Impact of the Rehnquist Court, 34 TULSA L.J.
15, 33-34, 37-39 (1998)).
164 See Richard B. Lillich, The Constitution and International Human Rights, 83 AM. J.
INT'L L. 851, 851 (1989) (stating that "contemporary observers ... rightly praise the con-
stitution's concern with human rights").
165 See Hughlett, supra note 94, at 180 (explaining that "[s]ome external interpretive
tool is necessary at times to resolve constitutional questions").
166 Richard A. Posner, The Supreme Court, 2004 Term: Foreword: A Political Court, 119
HARv. L. REV. 31, 40 (2005).
167 Eskridge, supra note 101, at 560.
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Former Supreme Court Justice Benjamin Cardozo noted in his
writings that "the judge in shaping the rules of the law must
heed the social mores of the day."'16 Significantly the social
norms of the country are now directly influenced by those of
other countries and the world in general. To require Judges to
ignore this important fact is both illogical and damaging to our
nation's jurisprudence.
IV. FORECAST FOR THE FUTURE
The membership on the Supreme Court recently changed with
the passing of Chief Justice Rehnquist in 2005 and the retire-
ment of the influential, and often swing voter, Justice Sandra
Day O'Connor in 2006. Both Justices supported the use of inter-
national law in certain contexts. 169 Beyond her extrajudicial
statements on the topic, 1 70 Justice O'Connor made it clear in her
Roper dissent, where she disagreed with Justice Scalia's asser-
tion that the use of international law is always inappropriate
when interpreting the U.S. Constitution, that it can be proper in
certain circumstances. 17'
Although the views of the replacements, Chief Justice John
Roberts and Justice Samuel Alito are yet to be determined, one
can speculate from their confirmation hearings, as both were
asked what they thought was the proper role of foreign law in
168 BENJAMIN CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 104 (Yale University
Press ed., 1991) (1921).
169 See Sandra Day O'Connor, Keynote Address, Proceedings of the Ninety-Sixth Annual
Meeting of the American Society of International Law, 96 AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. PROC. 348,
350 (2002) ("[alithough international law and the law of other nations are rarely binding
upon our decisions in U.S. courts, conclusions reached by other countries and by the in-
ternational community should at times constitute persuasive authority in American
courts"); William Rehnquist, Constitutional Courts - Comparative Remarks (1989), re-
printed in GERMAN AND ITS BASIC LAW: PAST, PRESENT AND FUTURE-A GERMAN-AMERICAN
SYMPOSIUM 411, 412 (Paul Kirchhof & Donald P. Kommers eds., 1993) ("it is time that the
United States courts begin looking to the decisions of other constitutional courts to aid in
their own deliberative process").
170 See O'Connor, supra note 169 at 350 (endorsing reliance on decision of international
courts as persuasive authority).
171 543 U.S. 551, 604 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) ("[I] disagree with Justice Scalia's con-
tention ...that foreign and international law have no place in our Eighth Amendment
jurisprudence. Over the course of nearly half a century, the Court has consistently re-
ferred to foreign and international law as relevant to its assessment of evolving standards
of decency").
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U.S. Supreme Court decisions. 72 When asked by Senator Kyl
about foreign law in constitutional interpretation, Justice Rob-
erts's response was to first express concern about accountability
because judges in this country are not accountable to the peo-
ple. 7 3 He then expressed concern about the discretion of judges
and stated: "[i]n foreign law, you can find anything you want. If
you don't find it in the decisions of France or Italy, it's in the de-
cisions of Somalia or Japan or Indonesia or wherever...
"[l]ooking at foreign law for support is like looking out over a
crowd and picking out your friends."17 4 He maintained that for-
eign law allowed judges to incorporate their personal preferences,
though cloaked in precedent of a foreign law, to interpret the
Constitution.1 7 5
Justice Alito's response to the same question by Senator Kyl
was more definite as he replied "I don't think foreign law is help-
ful in interpreting the Constitution."176 He further elaborated
that the Constitution does two basic things: "it sets out the struc-
ture of our government and it protects fundamental rights."177 He
first explained that he did not think international law was help-
ful for interpreting the structure of our constitution because it is
unique to our country.178 He then went on to state that he did not
find foreign law helpful in interpreting individual rights and we
should look to our own Constitution and precedents. 179 He noted
that our country has been a leader in protecting fundamental
rights, and that at the time of our adoption of the Bill of Rights,
there were not many countries, possibly none, that protected
172 See Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of John G. Roberts, Jr. to be Chief Jus-
tice of the United States, Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 158
(2005), available at http://www.senate.gov/pagelayoutlreference/one item-and-teasers
/SupremeCourtNomination_Hearings.htm (last visited Oct. 17, 2007) [hereinafter Rob-
erts Hearings]; Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of Samuel Alito to be Associate
Justice of the United States, Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong.
277 (2006), available at http://www.senate.gov/pagelayout/reference/oneitemand
_teasers/SupremeCourtNominationHearings.htm (last visited Oct. 17, 2007) [hereinaf-
ter Alito Hearings].
173 Roberts Hearings, supra note 172, at 200 (commenting on the proper role of interna-
tional law when considered in regards to democratic theory).
174 Id. at 201.
175 Id. (finding this to be "a misuse of precedent").
'
76Alito Hearings, supra note 172, at 370.
1
77 Id.
17s Id. (commenting that the structure of our government is unique to our country).
179 Id. (stating that "[a]s for the protection of individual rights, I think that we should
look to our own Constitution and our own precedents").
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human rights the way our Bill of Rights did. 80 He then stated
"We have our own law. We have our own traditions. We have our
own precedents. And we should look to that in interpreting our
Constitution."' 8' 1 When Senator Coburn further questioned him
on a later date, Justice Alito first restated that he did not think
foreign law was useful or appropriate in interpreting the Consti-
tution.18 2 He then frankly stated "I think the framers would be
stunned by the idea that the Bill of Rights is to be interpreted by
taking a poll of the countries of the world."'8 3
If their Senate confirmation hearing statements are any indi-
cation, it seems likely that both Chief Justice Roberts and Justice
Alito lean more toward the Scalia camp of Justices who un-
equivocally oppose the use of international law in constitutional
interpretation. However, unlike Justice Alito, Justice Roberts
never expressly stated that he was opposed to the practice. Jus-
tice Roberts expressed concerns about the practice and seemed
worried about the way in which it was being used. 8 4 He never
stated that it was not a legitimate source of persuasive authority
under certain circumstances. Therefore, it is not completely im-
plausible that he might come to support the use of international
law in certain circumstances.
As significant as the views of the new membership are, there
are also seven sitting Justices who have already expressed their
views on the topic. Firmly on one side, Justices Scalia and Tho-
mas have made it clear that they always oppose the use of inter-
national law for constitutional interpretation. 8 5 Justice Scalia
adamantly dissented to both the Lawrence and Roper decisions
and explicitly criticized the use of international law in constitu-
tional interpretation in both decisions. 8 6 Justice Thomas has
180 Id. (explaining how our country has been a leader in the protection of individual
rights).
181 Id.
182 Id. ("I don't think that we should look to foreign law to interpret our own Constitu-
tion").
183 Id.
184 See Roberts Hearings, supra note 172 ("as a general matter[,] that there are a couple
of things that cause concern on my part about the use of foreign law as precedent").
185 See Koh, supra note 16, at 52 (explaining that Justices Scalia and Thomas exemplify
the "nationalist jurisprudence" which is "characterized by commitments to territoriality,
extreme deference to national executive power and political institutions, and resistance to
comity or international law as meaningful constraints on national prerogatives").
186 See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 622 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (stating that
"[t]hough the views of our own citizens are essentially irrelevant to the Court's decision
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similar views, finding it improper to "impose foreign moods, fads,
or fashions on Americans. '18 7
However, at one time or another, the remaining five Justices
have all supported the use of international law in constitutional
interpretation.1 8 8 Besides the fact that Justices Kennedy, Breyer,
Ginsburg, Souter, and Stevens were all in the majority of both
the Lawrence and the Roper decisions, Justices Kennedy, Breyer
and Ginsburg have made extrajudicial statements favoring the
practice. Justice Ginsburg spoke about the importance of com-
parative analysis in constitutional interpretation, especially
within the field of human rights. 8 9 On the subject of human
rights, she found that "[w]e are the losers if we neglect what oth-
ers can tell us about endeavors to eradicate bias against women,
minorities, and other disadvantaged groups. For irrational preju-
dice and rank discrimination are infectious in our world. In this
reality, as well as the determination to counter it, we all
share."190 She further expressed this view in her concurrence in
Grutter v. Bollinger'9' where she cited the text of the Interna-
tional Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Dis-
crimination for support of the position that race conscious pro-
grams must have a logical end.192
Justice Breyer has been perhaps the most vocal supporter, and
has written on the practice as well as engaged in a public debate
with Justice Scalia on the subject. 93 But to many, the biggest
today, the views of other countries and the so-called international community take center
stage"); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 598 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (positing that
"this Court.. .should not impose foreign moods, fads, or fashions on Americans" (citing
Foster v. Florida, 537 U.S. 990 (2002) (Thomas, J., concurring in denial of certiorari))).
187 Foster, 537 U.S. at 990 (Thomas, J., concurring in denial of certiorari).
188 See Breyer, supra note 3, at 265 (explaining that Justices Ginsburg, Souter and Ste-
vens have all embraced international law in constitutional interpretation); see also Too-
bin, supra note 103 (noting that Justice Kennedy has invoked international law in two
important court decisions).
189 See Ginsburg and Merritt, supra note 120, at 282 ("comparative analysis emphati-
cally is relevant to the task of interpreting constitutions and enforcing human rights").
190 Id.
191 539 U.S. 309 (2003).
192 Id. at 344 (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (finding that the need for race-conscious admis-
sions policies to be limited in time was in accord with the international understanding of
affirmative action).
193 See Breyer, supra note 3, at 266 (discussing the use of international law in constitu-
tional jurisprudence); The Relevance of Foreign Legal Materials in U.S. Constitutional
Cases: A Conversation Between Justice Antonin Scalia and Justice Stephen Breyer, 3 INT'L
J. CONST. L. 519, 519 (2005) (referring to the appropriateness of relying on international
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surprise has been the support of Justice Kennedy to the practice
of using international law for constitutional interpretation.
Along with Justice Breyer, he is one of the Justices most promi-
nently associated with the controversy. 194 Justice Kennedy ar-
rived at the court without a formal judicial philosophy and his
willingness to consider international law seems to reflect an open
mind and a willingness to learn from diverse sources. 195 His sup-
port for the practice also makes it clear that it is much more than
a liberal-conservative issue. 196 In fact, the support of Justices
Rehnquist and O'Connor, neither known as liberal Justices, fur-
ther emphasizes that to categorize this as a liberal issue misses
the point. The real point is that in an interdependent world
where many countries face the same issues, our justice system
can only benefit from looking to other nations to see how they
grappled with the issue, regardless of whether we resolve the
question in the same respect.
Despite the potential reluctance of the two new members to the
Court to look to international law as persuasive authority in con-
stitutional interpretation, the majority of the Court looks approv-
ingly at the practice. However, the loss of Justices Rehnquist
and O'Connor makes it a slim majority. Therefore, although it
seems likely that the practice of utilizing international law as
persuasive authority in appropriate circumstances will continue,
it is hard to predict what could happen when there is another
change in Court membership.
decisions in deciding American constitutional issues as "[almong the most hotly disputed
questions at the United States Supreme Court in recent years").
194 See Toobin, supra note 103 (stating that Kennedy and Breyer are the two Justices
most associated with the controversy over foreign law); see also Roger P. Alford, Sympo-
sium: "Outsourcing Authority?" Citation to Foreign Court Precedent in Domestic Jurispru-
dence: Four Mistakes in the Debate on "Outsourcing Authority", 69 ALB. L. REV. 653, 669
(2006) (referencing "Justice Kennedy's frequent participation" in "global exchanges with
other constitutional judges" and Justice Breyer as "the intellectual leader in the move-
ment toward constitutional comparativism").
195 See Toobin, supra note 103 (commenting that this has allowed Justice Kennedy to
"absorb[ ] the diverse lessons of a changing world.").
196 See id. (noting that it would be a mistake to regard the dispute over foreign law as
another iteration of America's conservative-liberal split); Alford, supra note 194, at 663
(describing the foreign law debate as "far more complex" than criticism from the right
against the left wings of politics).
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CONCLUSION
The use of international law is appropriate in constitutional in-
terpretation from both an originalist and non-originalist view-
point. An originalist looks to historical evidence of the Framers;
however, it is clear that the both Framers and early Justices as
well assumed that international law was part of our law. 197 A
non-originalist does not view the Framer's intent as binding, and
will look to external sources, and therefore should recognize in-
ternational law as a useful tool in constitutional interpreta-
tion. 198
Lawrence and Roper represented the Court's moving toward a
greater recognition of the usefulness of international law in de-
termining vague terms that necessarily develop with the times,
such as "evolving standards of decency" and "cruel and unusual
punishment."'1 99 In fact, Lawrence represents the first time the
Supreme Court cited foreign law in overruling a constitutional
precedent. 200 Roper represents the most extensive discussion of
international law in a majority opinion regarding capital pun-
ishment. 2 1 Both cases also demonstrate that the use of interna-
tional law for constitutional interpretation is not imposing the
views of foreigners on Americans, nor is it binding. It is simply a
modest aid that seeks to illuminate constitutional issues that our
country shares with a global community.
197 See Koh, supra note 16, at 44 (purporting that both the Framers and the early Jus-
tices "understood that the global legitimacy of a fledging nation crucially depended upon
the compatibility of its domestic law with the rules of the international system within
which it sought acceptance"); Lobel, supra note 17, at 1076-77 (supposing there to be
"substantial evidence" indicating that the Framers of the Constitution believed the gov-
ernment's power to be "limited by treaties and by fundamental principles of international
law").
198 See Gey, supra note 10, at 609 (stating non-originalists locate sources "in everything
from common community traditions to external moral schemes").
199 See Arvin, supra note 31, at 226 (noting that Roper, "taken in conjunction with At-
kins, Grutter, and Lawrence signals that ... the Court's appreciation for transnationalist
jurisprudence is ripening"). But see Mark Wendell DeLaquil, Symposium: "Outsourcing
Authority?" Citation to Foreign Court Precedent in Domestic Jurisprudence: Foreign Law
and Opinion in State Courts, 69 ALB. L. REV. 697, 702 (2006) (describing Roper as the "ex-
ception that proves the rule" of international authority receiving a "chilly reception" in
state courts).
200 See Eskridge, supra note 101, at 555 (explaining that "Lawrence represents the first
time the Supreme Court has cited foreign law in . . .overruling an American constitu-
tional precedent").
201 See Arvin, supra note 31, at 210 (noting that significance of Roper with regards to
the use of international law in U.S. cases).
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The Court's dynamic will necessarily change with two new Jus-
tices on the Court, replacing Justices that supported the practice,
in certain circumstances. However, even if theoretically they
both did oppose the practice in every instance, it would still leave
the five Justices who comprised the majorities in both Lawrence
and Roper. Therefore, it is the opinion of this author that the
Court is going to continue to move in the direction of recognizing
the laws of the international community in our constitutional ju-
risprudence as persuasive authority. This practice, simply put,
will enrich constitutional interpretation.
